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ABSTRACT 
 
Destruction to critical nuclear infrastructures would have a debilitating effect on 
national public health safety, national economy, security, etc.  For this reason, analysts 
perform safety risk analyses to quantify and understand the nature of unwanted events. 
Since the world has gone through many changes after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, nuclear 
security risk analysis became a necessity. So far, the safety and security risk analyses were 
done separately without a combined analyses and evaluation. This research thesis contains 
three major analysis sections that provides security, safety, and combined safety-security 
risk analysis that studied and analyzed possible accident scenarios. 
This research starts with the security pathway analysis, which eventually 
calculated the initiating event frequency of a successful adversary attack and estimated the 
security risk value. The safety analysis represented a series of natural (random) safety 
systems failure events. On the other hand, the safety-security analysis considered a 
security initiating event followed by safety systems failure. Fault and event trees were 
formed using the SAPHIRE software and used for the description of failure scenarios. 
The main outcome of this research is a methodology development to perform 
combined safety-security initiating event analysis to compute the joint top event system 
failure frequency. Along with the calculation of the systems’ failure frequency, estimation 
of the public risk associated for sample failure scenarios, and the determination of how 
security initiating events in a series of safety events failure affect the total risk value was 
also carried out. Considering a security attack as an initiating event that triggers safety 
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system failure was analyzed for developing the methodology to perform a combined 
safety-security risk analysis estimation.  
 The analysis showed that the security attack substantially changed the risk value 
when it was considered in the failure process. This created a major need to consider both 
the security and safety failures together in the future systems for failure scenarios. More 
evaluations should be done to the security system measures to reduce the total associated 
risk value. Future efforts should look for further enhancements and development in the 
analysis of the deployed safety and security systems. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
ASD                         Adversary Sequence Diagram 
DBT                         Design Basis Threat  
EASI                         Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption 
EDG                          Emergency Diesel Generator 
EPS                           Emergency Power System 
IE                              Initiating Event 
LOOP                        Loss Of Offsite Power  
NRC                          Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
PRA                           Probabilistic Risk Assessment  
PPS                            Physical Protection Systems 
PSA                           Probabilistic Safety Analysis 
SAPHIRE                  System Analysis Programs for Hand-On Integrated Reliability                       
Evaluations 
SFP Spent Fuel Pool 
VESPA Vulnerability Evaluation Simulating Plausible Attacks  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Safety and security design inclusion in nuclear fuel cycle facilities are mandatory 
by the operating country’s regulatory agency. This is to minimize the probability of 
nuclear or radiological incidents or accidents, and hence, to keep the risk to the public and 
the environment below the acceptable limit. Design analyses performed for risk 
quantification ensure the adequacy of the safety and security measures at the nuclear fuel 
cycle facility.  In this research, risk evaluation of an operating nuclear spent fuel pool 
(SFP) facility was performed considering both safety-type and security-type Initiating 
Events (IEs) to demonstrate the differences in performing a joint safety-security risk 
evaluation. The objective is to understand the benefits of employing a combined safety-
security risk evaluation methodology.   
Nuclear safety risk analysis is generally performed in three steps.  The first step is 
to calculate the damage frequency of a critical system, for example the core damage 
frequency of a nuclear reactor using the event tree and fault tree techniques [1].  In this 
step, analysis on the progression of an IE, for example a valve failure leading to a top 
event such as reactor core damage, is carried out considering the failure frequency data of 
intermediate system elements. This step is followed by the radioactive source term 
estimation due to the potential system damage. The final step is the estimation of 
consequence in the public domain from the partial or total release of the radioactive source 
term to the environment. A system-of-systems analysis is then carried out to quantify 
system vulnerabilities, which if not addressed, could lead to undesirable events. 
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Deterministic and probabilistic approaches are commonly used in nuclear safety analysis 
for estimating the accident frequency using event and fault trees methods [2].  A 
probabilistic approach is used in this thesis research for the safety analysis and for the 
combined safety-security analysis to determine the failure frequency of the SFP. A 
different approach, namely, adversary sequence diagram (ASD) approach is used for the 
failure frequency from a security IE. Safety-type, security-type and a combination safety-
security-type IEs are considered.  
 A security threat and the related IEs are not considered in the safety risk analysis 
approach currently used in the industry. Instead, the vulnerability of the physical 
protection system (PPS) is performed independently, even though the consequence 
resulting from a security or safety IE is in the same public domain. An attempt is made 
here to study the effect on the overall risk by considering security IE along with the 
subsequent random failure of the intermediate safety system elements that may lead to the 
top event. 
Estimation of the security risk is made by utilizing the equation  
                                                    R = PA*(1- PI *PN)*C                                                   (1) 
 Where PA:  is the frequency of adversary attack, PI:  is the probability of interruption of 
the adversary by the PPS, PN:  is the probability of neutralizing the adversary by the 
response force, and C: is the consequence of the attack [3]. While the safety risk is 
determined (in its simple form) using the equation  
                                                    R= F * C                                                                     (2) 
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 Where F:  is the safety system failure frequency per year and C represents the undesired 
consequences similar to that of equation (1) [4]. Contrary to the security risk equation, F 
does describe the probability (a numerical measure of the likelihood that an event will 
occur) of a random, independent event. On the other hand, the security event represents a 
non-random IE. The consequence value C in both equations (1) and (2) is the same no 
matter what triggered a system failure (safety or a security IE), since it similarly affects 
the public domain. The proposition and development of a combined safety-security risk 
analysis methodology in this research was largely inspired by the shared consequence 
value. 
In this research, a new methodology is presented to determine a combined safety-
security frequency of an undesired event at a hypothetical SFP facility. The analysis   
includes the security attack at a SFP facility or its components as an initiating postulated 
event in addition to the random failure of the safety components.  
 
1.1 Objectives  
 
The main scope of the study is to analyze the differences in risk calculations due 
to the possible accident scenarios at a SFP by determining the failure frequencies from 
security-type, safety-type and combined security-safety-type IEs. The methodology under 
development is not specific to SFP but should be generally applicable to other nuclear fuel 
cycle facilities as well. The objective of the study is to understand the interplay between 
nuclear safety and security IEs in a nuclear fuel cycle facility so as to: (1) determine their 
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independent contributions to the public risk, and (2) determine whether there is value in 
performing a combined security-safety risk quantification arising from a security-type and 
safety-type IEs so that prudent resource allocations can be made.  
 
1.2 Previous Work 
 
A literature review shows diverse definitions of the terms security and safety [5, 
6]. Many of the definitions present the distinctions between the two terms as: System vs. 
Environment and Malicious vs. Accidental. In the first distinction, security deals with risks 
from the environment over the system, while safety deals with risks from the system over 
the environment.  Whereas per the second distinction, security attempts to mitigate the 
risk from malicious acts while safety addresses risk from accidents [7].    
In another study, a methodology was addressed to enhance the synergies between 
safety and security [8]. Since the early time of nuclear industry, growing safety concerns 
became visible to the analyst; however, security was not a major concern. 9/11 and the 
growth of terrorism more recently brought security concerns onto the public agenda. In 
order to protect and prevent the loss of valuable assets, a PPS is deployed along with the 
existing safety systems. In the current analyses, safety and security systems are 
independently evaluated to determine the failure frequency of their related elements and 
the associated risk.  
Various risk assessments have been done on safety and security IEs individually, 
but have never considered both as interconnected concepts. There are many approaches 
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for evaluating the effectiveness of a security system from a strictly security IE perspective. 
One is called the Vulnerability Evaluation Simulating Plausible Attacks (VESPA). 
VESPA provides a what-if scenarios-based comparative tool for the selection of plausible 
targets that, from the perspective of a terrorist, present a high potential of certain 
vulnerabilities to be exploited [9]. Another approach for studying security and safety that 
can be found in the literature is analyzing the system through the insider (the person who 
has access to sensitive locations in the nuclear facility), in which a person can bypass the 
security measures, or collude with outsiders to harm the safety systems [10, 11].  Game 
theory approach is another method which serves the risk analysis assessment process. The 
outcome from the game theory helps in examining how the PPS functions when attacked 
by a knowledgeable adversary with insider help at a hypothetical nuclear facility [12]. 
While these approaches are entirely focused on security, they neglect safety. 
Safety is also given individual analysis. A technical study of SFP accident risk by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) published in 2001 works as a basis for 
analyzing the failure process of SFP. The study provided risk assessment for severe 
accident scenarios and estimated their consequences. For a given set of fuel characteristics, 
the time required to boil off enough water that allows fuel rods to reach high temperature 
that initiate zirconium cladding fire was estimated by the study. The summary of the study 
was that the risk of a SFP accident that leads to a zirconium fire was low, despite the large 
consequences [13]. This study, however, gave no attention to security risk, and currently 
there is no consideration for a safety-security joint risk analysis and evaluation for a failure 
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event.  In summary, previous and current safety and security risk analyses are done 
separately without considering the synergies in both risk analyses. 
 
1.3 Methodology and Procedure  
 
The nuclear fuel cycle facility selected for the current study is a SFP, which allows 
for the analysis of public risk arising from the interplay between nuclear security-type and 
safety-type IEs. The EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) model is used 
to calculate the security IE frequency leading to the failure of a safety component [3]. 
Further progression of this security IE to a top event is analyzed using a probabilistic 
safety analysis (PSA) tool, called the  System Analysis Programs for Hand-On Integrated 
reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE, version 8), to obtain a combined pool damage 
frequency [14]. For the progression of events leading to a top event, the failure of the 
intermediate safety elements is assumed as natural random-type failures. The objective is 
to compare the pool damage frequency estimated from a security IE to that of a safety IE 
and vice versa. 
 Additionally, a security sabotage event and a safety-type only IE at the SFP is 
analyzed.  At least one adversary path to the SFP is analyzed from the security side, 
addressing the detection and delay elements of the PPS with their respective values of 
probability of detection (PD) and time delay (tD). The response force time was estimated 
with the assumption that the response force will travel by foot. These elements and values 
lead to the calculation of the probability of interruption, PI, one of the terms needed to 
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assess the security vulnerability (refer to equation (1)). The vulnerability of a security path 
is called the probability of adversary success (Ps), which is equal to (1- PI*PN). Adversary 
success probability times the frequency of attack per year gives the frequency of a 
successful security attack. This frequency is used in the combined safety-security analysis 
the security IE failure frequency. 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Level-1 is used for the safety analysis and 
the combined safety-security analysis in this research to calculate the associated combined 
failure frequency of the system. The safety analysis represents a series of natural safety 
system failure events. On the other hand, the safety-security analysis considers a security 
IE followed by safety system failures. The PRA analysis includes fault and event trees 
formation, which is used for the description of failure scenarios from the basic event to 
the top event and calculation of the related frequency of failure of the analyzed system 
elements. The event and fault trees are created using the SAPHIRE software to assist the 
risk evaluation process of the chosen system failure scenarios from IEs of safety-type and 
security-type. 
 The tasks of the research are:   
1.  Develop a simple hypothetical SFP layout. 
2. Conduct a security analysis to the SFP layout in order to calculate the security 
parameters such as the probability of interruption, probability of neutralization, 
frequency of attack, and the associated risk.  
3. Identify the possible IEs including security attack as external event. 
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4.  Perform safety risk analysis Level-1 PRA for the cooling system component of 
the SFP for natural random failure events. 
5. Conduct combined safety-security analysis for the cooling system components of 
the SFP, considering the security attack as an IE. 
6. Create event and fault trees using SAPHIRE 8 software included in safety analysis, 
and safety-security joint analysis. 
7. Calculate safety system failure frequency and joint safety-security failure 
frequency.  
8. Calculate the associated risk value for each case of safety-type, security-type and 
joint security-safety-type IEs. 
 
1.4 Significance of Work  
 
The significance of this research is that it identifies a methodology for calculating 
a combined safety-security failure frequency and combined risk value that could serve as 
the basis of efficient risk analysis process security-type and safety-type IEs. The combined 
analysis process will improve the evaluation of the deployed safety and security systems 
in any nuclear facility. As a result, it will provide a combined failure frequency which 
considers the safety and security interface, as well as a better estimation of the risk value. 
The new combined risk evaluations methodology will lead to a balanced risk evaluation 
so that resources can be better allocated at the safety and security system levels. 
 
 9 
 
1.5 SFP (Target) Characteristics and Accidents Consequences 
 
Each year, U.S. nuclear power plants generate about 2,000 metric tons of spent 
fuel with an accumulative amounts of 65,000 metric tons since the start of nuclear power 
generation [15]. Almost 75% of the spent fuel in the U.S is stored in SFPs to reduce its 
deadly effects. A SFP is used to store the spent fuel temporarily because the radioactive 
isotopes in the spent fuel produce heat continuously as a result of the decay process. Safe 
storage of the spent fuel in pools requires its continued cooling at least first 5 years. Failure 
of this cooling leads to water vaporization, un-shielding the fuel and the risk of 
environmental radioactive release. About 1000 Sv/hr are produced from each spent fuel 
rod radiation per hour at a 1-foot distance from the rod; this amount of radiation is enough 
to end life in seconds [16]. This radiation comes from a wide variety of isotopes with long 
half-lives generated in the reactors during their normal operations. Table 1 summarizes 
the activity level of the main radiation isotopes that can be found in repository such as a 
spent fuel pool after a cooling period at least 5 years 
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Table 1 Spent fuel main radiation isotopes and percent activity [16] 
 
Isotope  Half-life ( years)  Percent Activity (%)  
Cesium-137  30 38%  
Plutonium-241 14 26% 
Strontium- 90  29 25% 
Cobalt -60 5.3 0.22% 
Samarium-151 90 0.20% 
Nickel-63 100 0.18% 
 
 
 
According to Table 1 about 40 percent of the radioactivity in the spent fuel comes 
from cesium-137. Usually, the inventory at the spent fuel pools is more than the inventory 
at the reactors because the pools are designed with a capacity to absorb 2-3 time’s reactors’ 
contents, which represents a massive amount of radiation. The pools typically are designed 
in a rectangular shape about 45 feet deep, and the walls are made of reinforced concrete 
with a thickness about 4-5 feet and a stainless steel liner to resist cracks, breaks, and 
corrosion [16]. Fig. 1 shows a simple example of what the SFP looks like [17].  
 
1.5.1 Cooling system function and components 
 
Water flows to the spent fuel through scuppers at the normal water level, extracting 
the heat from the spent fuel. The water in the pool is circulated through a cooling system 
to remove the continuously produced decay heat that is produced by the radioactive 
isotopes in the spent fuel. Finally, the pool cooling system cools the water before injecting 
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it back into the pool. The water must be maintained at a certain level in the entire pool to 
guarantee continues operation of the cooling system. If the water were to rapidly drain 
from the pool, this will cause the cooling system to stop working.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Example of a commercial light water reactor SFP 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 shows the hypothetical layout of the SFP and its components, which was  
prepared  and  used in this research for the safety risk analysis part that will be illustrated 
in one of the later sections. Based on Fig. 2, the SFP has a cooling system that is composed 
of a rectangular spent fuel pool, cooling pumps, valves, heat exchanger, makeup tank, 
reservoir, and filtration system.  
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Fig. 2 SFP and cooling system component diagram 
 
 
 
As is clear from the SFP layout, a cooling system is composed of two parts: the 
primary cooling system, and the secondary cooling system. The primary cooling system 
has two main pumps that reflect system redundancy in which one pump works at a time 
during normal operation and the other is reserved for an emergency situation. One of the 
pumps draws coolant from the SFP through a cooling pipe line, where two valves are 
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installed on each pipe line to control the process. The primary cooling system also has a 
valve installed on the main pipe line (main valve) that controls the water withdrawal from 
the pool. Then water is passed through a heat exchanger system to extract the heat, and 
cool it down to be returned to the pool. The heat exchanger system is composed of a heat 
exchanger, and two redundant pumps with their respective valves. One pump works at a 
time that extracts the heat from the heat exchanger to the ultimate heat sink, and the other 
pump is reserved for emergency situations. In contrast, the secondary cooling system is 
composed of two pumps: a diesel driven pump and an electrical driven pump, which are 
installed over two independent pipelines to maintain independency and redundancy in the 
system. These pumps withdraw water from the reservoir and inject it into the SFP during 
abnormal and accident conditions  
A small amount of water that passes through a filtration process is returned back 
to the discharge line. Though not analyzed in this research, a makeup water tank with a 
limited flow rate supplements the small losses due to evaporation by injecting water to the 
main line of the primary system. For large loss-of-coolant-inventory accidents, water 
addition through the makeup pumps does not successfully mitigate the loss of the 
inventory event unless the location of inventory loss is isolated. For safety purposes plants 
do not have drain paths in their SFPs that could lower the pool level more than 15 feet 
below the normal pool operating level [16]. 
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1.5.2 SFP accident consequences 
 
Any possible accident at the SFP, such as fire, a pipe breaking, etc., while it’s 
loaded with radioactive sources could result in catastrophic consequences. Of the possible 
accidents, fire would result in a severe damage. It would contaminate with radioactivity 
about 188 square miles around the nuclear reactor, with 28,000 possible cancer fatalities 
and almost 59 billion dollars as a cost of the damage for a typical reactor power facility 
[16]. Any accident that expose the fuel to air and steam would cause the zirconium 
cladding to react exothermically, catching fire at about 800 degrees Celsius.  The amount 
of the   cesium-137 in spent fuel pools represents about 20 to 50 million curies of high 
penetrating radiation with a long half-life  that could be totally released into the 
environment in case of a  severe accident [16]. Making any accident happen at the SFP 
that lead to severe damages and radiation release is considered the main threat from a 
sabotage attack. Thus, preventing this requires deploying safety and security systems to 
make sure no severe accident will take place. Although elimination of accident probability 
is impossible, reducing it is possible. 
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2. SECURITY ANALYSIS  
 
This section represents the pathway security analysis, which includes the complete 
security path analysis from the offsite area to inside the reactor facility up to the spent fuel 
pool. The main two security concerns are theft (nuclear or radioactive materials) and 
sabotage (process or support equipment). For this study, the focus was on the sabotage 
case. Analysis was on many possible adversaries’ paths to sabotage the SFP target. Since 
the focus in this research is on the methodology of analysis and connecting security with 
safety, the only path included in this research thesis is the most vulnerable path (the path 
with the highest risk value). The main outcomes of the pathway security analysis is  found 
by calculating the security parameters such as: the probability of interruption, the 
probability of neutralization, the security attack frequency, the consequence value related 
to the accident level, and estimating the associated path risk value. In order to understand 
the analysis concept, key terms are defined:  
 Risk:  The potential for loss or harm due to the likelihood of an unwanted event and its 
adverse consequences. In security, risk is based on the analysis and aggregation of three 
widely recognized factors: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. 
Consequence: The results of an event, which includes immediate, short- and long-term, 
direct and indirect losses. Loss may include human, environment, and economy, political 
and other impacts. The value of C used in this study is scaled from 0 to 1 representing the 
severity of the event. 
 16 
 
Threat: Any indication, circumstance, or event with the potential to cause the loss of, or 
damage to, an asset or population.  
Vulnerability: Any weakness in an asset’s or infrastructure’s design, implementation, or 
operation that can be exploited by an adversary. The weaknesses can occur in building 
characteristics, equipment properties, personnel behavior, locations of people, or 
operational and personnel practices [18].  
 
2.1 SFP Security Path Analysis 
 
The analysis carried out is to calculate the vulnerability parameters of a security 
pathway, which is the probability of interruption and probability of neutralization (PI, and 
PN   respectively). PI   calculation is through the EASI excel model [3] and the PN calculation 
is by using excel sheet macro [19]. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show examples of what the EASI 
model and PN excel sheet respectively look like.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Example of the EASI model layout [3] 
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Fig. 4 Example of excels macro sheet layout, which is used for PN calculation [19] 
 
 
 
2.1.1 Physical protection measures 
 
The SFP assumed to be in full capacity contains radioactive nuclear spent fuel 
assemblies, which are especially attractive sabotage target due to the severity of 
radiological consequence. For this reason, several protection layers exist between the 
valuable assets and the offsite area.  The hypothetical facility site diagram and the layout 
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of the SFP location that is used in the pathway security analysis are shown in Figs. 5-6 (In 
the figures below, each P# represents a door) [20].    
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Hypothetical nuclear reactor facility site diagram 
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Fig. 6 Hypothetical reactor confinement, with walls and doors (P5, P6, P7 & P8) 
 
 
 
2.1.2 Security analysis theoretical principles 
 
The analysis philosophy is to find the risk value of an adversary’s specific path. 
The path has several detection and delay physical protection elements including: patrols, 
detecting sensor, walls, obstacles, fences, doors, etc., where each protection element has 
its own detection probability (PD) and delay time (tD). As a part of the deployed protection 
measures, there is a Critical Detection Point (CDP) which is the last detection element, 
where the response force has enough time to reach the adversaries before they finish their 
task.  The PI considered as an accumulation of probabilities of detection for each detection 
element along a path. For calculating of the PI, we define the non-detecting probability at 
each detection element to be:  
 20 
 
                                       BD
j = 1- PD
j                                                                                                            (3) 
 Where PD
j is the detection probability at protection element j, so the probability that 
adversaries will not be defeated (combined non-detection probability) can be calculated 
by:  
                                                 BD
 = ∏ BD
jJ
j=1                                                                   (4) 
The adversaries might follow several possible paths to reach the target. From the 
analyst’s point of view, the path with the most interest is the path that comes with the 
combination of the minimum probabilities of interruption and neutralization is the one 
with highest risk. The worst path for a system may not have lowest PI, because PN   also 
contribute as the probability of effectiveness of the security system equal to PI * PN.  After 
determining the PI and PN of the chosen path, this leads to calculating the needed 
vulnerability value of the chosen path, for the target.  
  In order to calculate the probability of interruption associated with the chosen 
path and to evaluate the effectiveness of the deployed PPS, it’s necessary to make a 
scenario of attack and build a scenario graphical model. The graphical model, known as 
Adversary Sequence Diagram (ASD) views the security system with its detection and 
delay elements. In order to create an ASD, the following steps have to be applied as 
following: 
- Model the facility by separating into adjacent physical areas. 
- Define protection layers and path element at each area. 
- Show path segments between the areas through path. 
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Each protection layers consists of one or more protection elements (the basic building 
blocks of a PPS). Fig. 7 shows an example of ASD layout and concept:  
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Adversary sequence diagram layout.  
 
 
 
2.2 The Chosen Security Path and Probability of Interruption Calculation 
 
The possible path chosen for this research, which the adversaries might follow is 
shown in Fig. 8. In this case the adversaries were assumed to conduct a sabotage to the 
SFP at the reactor building by going through the plant controlled building and reactor 
building doors respectively (see P5 and P6 in Fig. 6). The adversary’s goal is to make 
severe radiological consequences and contamination to the area either by bombing the 
SFP that will affect both the spent and fresh fuel, or by bombing SFP cooling equipment 
which is in the same floor.  
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Fig. 8 Probable adversaries attack path 
 
 
 
In the previous figure the adversaries moved from the offsite area to the reactor 
building by penetrating the fence  running to the vehicle door P9  penetrating the 
vehicle door  running to the controlled building P5 door  penetrating the P5 door  
running to the P6 door  penetrating the P6 door  running to the target  sabotage. 
 Following the chosen path, the adversary will face several protection layers with 
protection elements. Assuming the adversary is using explosives to penetrate the doors, 
the Response Force Time (RFT) was calculated to be 270 seconds with the assumption 
that the response force will travel by foot and the running speed is 3m/s [20].  Fig. 9 
represents the resulting ASD for the chosen security path. Between two physical areas 
many protection elements are deployed such as vehicle main gate, fence, personnel main 
gate, walls, and doors where each protection element (such as the 2.5m fence) is 
represented with two main boxes below. There appear two numbers; the left one represents 
the detection probability of the protection element as an example the 0.8 PD of the 2.5m 
fence, and the right number represents the delay time tD associated with passing the 
protection element for example the 10s of the 2.5 fence [20].    
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Fig. 9 Controlled building attack path ASD  
 
 
 
Based on Fig. 9, the CDP (see subsection 2.1.2) is at the location where the 
adversaries run to the plant controlled building to penetrate the doors (P5) from the 
protected area. If they are not detected before completing the penetrating action they are 
likely to reach the target and sabotage the SFP. As previously mentioned, the EASI model 
is used for calculating the PI value, inserting each task’s time delay and probability of 
detection for each layer of the protection element. The probability of alarm 
communication assumed is 97%, and standard deviation for all time delay is 30% of its 
value. As an example, the standard deviation is 30% of the response force time, which was 
calculated to be 270 seconds; therefore the standard deviation is 81 seconds.  
Inserting all these parameters and assumptions into the EASI model, which is 
shown in Table 2, the resulting probability of interruption associated with the chosen path 
is 0.902. This is considered a high value of interruption that usually results in a sufficiently 
low vulnerability in the security system; this also depends upon having a high probability 
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of neutralization by the response force, which depends on the number of the response force 
members, weapons, training, equipment, and etc. The EASI model includes uncertainty 
calculation. But for calculating the uncertainty manually, and since it’s a multiplication 
operation, Eq. 5 is used. The PI error and the BD error up to the CDP are the same since 
both terms are related by Eq .3 (see subsection 2.1.2). Table 2 represents the EASI model 
tasks description and the results of the PI security sabotage attack calculation. 
                                                    𝜎u = u √(
σx
x
)
2
+ (
σy
y
)
2
+…                                               (5) 
Where u is the error in the term u. While x and y represents the non-detection probabilities 
(1- PD) for task 1 and task 2 in Table 2 respectively, and so on up to the CDP (as an 
example:  the non- detection probability of task (1) in Table 2   = 1- PD1 = 1- 0.8 = 0.2). In 
the previous path the CDP is until the third task in Table 2.   With the assumption that the 
error in each non detection probability is 10%, the non-detection probability error up to 
the CDP is 0.053. 
Therefore,  the error in PI  is = 0.054, For the most effective evaluation of the path 
study, the value of PI that maximize the vulnerability is  considered as the EASI model 
includes the error and provides the value with the lowest value of PI. Note: any other 
manual calculation of the uncertainties is done using the same process as in the previous 
PI uncertainty calculation, and by applying the following general uncertainty equation. 
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Where 𝜎u represents the uncertainty in any value of a math operation.  
 
Table 2 EASI model results of the PI security sabotage attack calculation  
 
      Probability of Interruption: 0.902 
  Estimate of Probability of     
  Adversary Alarm  
System Response 
Time (in seconds) 
  Sequence Communication  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
  Interruption 0.97   270 81 
       
         Delays (in seconds): 
 Task Description P(Detection) Location Mean: 
Standard 
Deviation 
 1 Penetrates the Fence  0.8 e 10 3.0 
 2 Run to the vehicle gate at P9 0.02 P9 90 27.0 
 3 Penetrate the vehicle gate  0.5 P9 30 9.0 
 4 
Run to the plant controlled 
building at P5 0.02 P5 90 27.0 
 5 Penetrates the doors at P5 0.99 P5 54 16.2 
 6 Run to the P6 doors  0.02 P6 20 6.0 
 7 Penetrate the P6 doors  0.99 P6 127 38.1 
 8 Run to the SNP pool 0.02 RB 15 4.5 
 9 sabotage the facility  1 RB 51 15.3 
 
 
 
2.3 PN and Frequency of Attack Calculation 
 
 
In order to calculate the PN, the states’ competent authority prepares a threat 
assessment document, which contains information about the anticipated threats such as a 
terrorist group. This document works as the basis of defining the Design Basis Threat 
(DBT), which should consist of the attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or 
external adversaries who might attempt unauthorized removal of nuclear material or 
sabotage, against which a nuclear security system is designed and evaluated [21]. The 
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DBT works as the basis for testing and exercising, making potentially expensive decisions, 
and the design of nuclear security system.  
A major step for estimating the security event frequency is to determine the PN, 
which is the result of response force engagement after interruption of the adversaries (PN 
can be reduced by adversaries' tactics). For the PN calculation, the adversaries’ 
capabilities, tactics, and strength are required along with the state’s neutralization strategy 
and measures. Data about the threat, response force, and PPS is required to analyze the 
engagements and provide the proper value of the PN. Data about the response force 
equipment also is needed such as: basic duty weapons, special duty weapons, intermediate 
force weapons, and vehicles. 
 Then the neutralization analysis starts by making scenarios and applying analysis 
methodology. The neutralization analysis method used in this research is a simple 
numerical method. In addition to this method, other methods can be applied such as: expert 
opinion, complex computer simulations, simulated physical engagements (Force-on-
Force), and actual engagements.   
 The following assumptions were made on the adversary and response force 
capabilities. The adversaries are highly trained and have excellent tactics.  Their attack 
plan is at night, and they are a group of 8. They have 7.62 mm semi-automatics, and 9 mm 
handguns, which are bladed. On the other hand, the response force has four teams of 
response, which are two armed guards, two men as tactical response, two snipers, and 12 
men of offsite response. With these aforementioned assumptions, the PN value obtained 
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using an excel macro- calculator (Fig. 4) is 0.94 [19]. Table 3 summarizes DBT for a 
terrorist group that is considered for the PN calculation. 
 
Table 3   DBT information for the calculation of the PN 
 
   Adversary type : Terrorist 
 Motivation Ideological High 
  Economic Low 
  Political High 
  Personal Low 
 Intentions Targets of Interest Sabotage of nuclear or radiological materials  
  Likely Malicious Act 
Radiological explosion and  release onsite and 
offsite  
  Willingness to Die Yes 
 Capabilities Group Size 8 
  Tactics 
Stealth, Deceit, Speed Assault, Overwhelming 
Force 
  
Intelligence Gathering 
Means 
Surveillance from Outside, Passive Insider for 
Intel, Open Source Analysis 
  Weapons 
7.62 mm semi-automatic assault rifles, 9 mm 
handgun, bladed weapon. 
  Explosives  Advanced explosives , homemade bombs 
  Equipment and Tools commercially available hand tools and power tools 
  Funding 40,000 $ 
  Modes of Transportation Light trucks including 4x4, light cars 
  Technical Skills Basic chemistry, basic electronics 
  Cyber Skills No 
  Other Knowledge Yes 
  Support Structure Minor 
  Insider Assistance Yes, passive 
 
 
 
Having the PI and PN values calculated, and considering the value of the frequency 
of attack to be 1.0E-03 attack per year [22], the analyst can calculate the frequency of a 
successful security attack (FSe) using part of Eq .1 as follows:  
                                                  FSe = PA (1- PI *PN)                                                        (7) 
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Inserting the previously calculated values into Eq .7 results in FSe = 1.63 E-4   
successful attack per year. This number considered as the frequency of adversaries’ arrival 
successfully to the target and conducting an attack. This number is used throughout the 
analysis process in the SAPHIRE.8 code whenever a security attack is presented [14].  
 
2.4 Consequence (C) and Security Risk Estimation 
 
As previously stated the sabotage attack to the SFP might result in a very bad 
consequence that can lead to the release of a significant amount of radioactivity to the 
environment.  Some examples of damage caused and the consequences of the SFP damage 
are: 
 Mechanical damage to fuel: the direct attack to the SFP might cause damage to the 
fuel and the release of radioactive materials from the fuel may occur. 
 Possible attack by an adversary to the SFP by bombing it could cause direct 
damage to the pool and leakage of the water from the spent fuel pool, leading to 
the fuel overheating, resulting in damage to the fuel cladding integrity and the 
possible release of radioactive materials to the environment. 
 Damage to the pool might lead to leakage through the pool liner or evaporation of 
coolant following the forced loss of the cooling system by targeting it in the attack. 
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      The final parameter that is needed to estimate the security risk value associated 
with SFP sabotage using Eq .1 is the consequence (C) value. This consequence value can 
be found using Eq .8.    
                                                        C=0.8*10N-7                                                       (8) 
Where N, is the event level that resulted after failure of system components according to 
the International Nuclear and radiological Event Scale (INES) [23]. In this analysis, the 
sabotage of the SFP is assumed to be level 4 accident with a minor off- site release of 
radioactive materials. The associated relative consequence value C is 8.0E-04. Applying 
these values to Eq .1 yields the risk value as 1.30E-07 per year for the case of SFP 
sabotage. The uncertainties in the security analysis calculations can be found in the chapter 
on results and discussions later.  
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3. SAFETY ANALYSIS  
 
The SFP components failure analysis was conducted using the PRA level 1 
approach, to numerically quantify the risk values, where a series of components failure 
led to the release of radiation from the pool. In this analysis, the failure frequencies of the 
cooling system components of the SFP (such as valves, and pumps) were considered to 
calculate the frequency of failure starting from the basic IE to the whole cooling system 
failure top event. The purpose of this section is to provide scenarios for cooling system 
failure along with the calculation of the frequency of failure associated with each analyzed 
scenario. Three scenarios were analyzed (subsection 3.3) as follows:  
 All natural mechanical failure of the SFP cooling system. 
 Heavy load drop external IE accompanied with natural failure. 
 Seismic external IE accompanied with natural failure.  
The first step in a PRA is to identify a top event and different IE’s that could lead 
to this event. For this reason, fault trees are used to identify and quantify possible system 
failures. At the lowest level of the fault tree is the basic event assigned with a frequency 
value. The frequency used is a value representing how many times an event likely to 
happen during a time frame (ex. 1/year). Each event in the fault tree has its frequency 
value, where the Boolean logic is followed to determine the frequency of failure of the top 
event. In order to calculate the top event frequency of failure, each individual component 
failure frequency must be found first. The initial frequency of failure data includes the 
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number of incidents and associated observation time (taking into account the fraction of 
time the plant is operational). The sources for this data could be:  
 Plant specific data: data derived from information directly collected at the plant. 
 Generic data: data derived from information not associated with the plant being 
analyzed, might be from similar plants or similar components used at other plants 
[24].  
A lack of observation of the hazardous events might create difficulties in 
estimating the frequency of these events. In this case, the generic data method was used 
instead to provide a frequency data of events. In this research, the data for the cooling 
system components of the SFP is generic data, since the SFP layout is a hypothetical one. 
As mentioned before, the basic event is the lowest level of a fault tree, representing an IE. 
An IE is an event that creates a disturbance in the plant and has the potential to lead to 
complete system damage [25], such as:  
 Internal events occurring during operation. (Such as failure of plant equipment, 
human errors, and loss of off-site power).   
 Internal hazards (internal fires, internal floods, and missiles). 
 Transients.  
 Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCAs)  
 External hazards (Natural, Human made such as Security events).  
Each cooling system component such as pumps and valves has its own failure 
frequency [26]. The main pumps in the primary and the secondary cooling system (see 
 32 
 
Fig. 2) have a natural random mechanical failure frequency of 3.00E-05 per year. 
Likewise, the valve’s failure frequency is 1.3E-02 per year [27]. 
 
3.1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Evaluation 
 
There is no safety without safety assessment, which is a systematic process that is 
carried out throughout the life time of the facility or the activity to ensure that the relevant 
safety requirements are met by the proposed or actual design [28].  The design of nuclear 
safety systems must be able to fulfill their function in an adequate manner, even in the 
event of failure of any one of their components. To ensure that the deployed safety systems 
meet the facility independency, diversity, and redundancy safety standards, at least two 
safety systems with the exact same function are generally installed. Fig. 10 shows an 
example of implementing the previously mentioned safety standards for the SFP cooling 
system in a reactor. For example, in this figure there are two cooling system heat 
exchangers (independency) each with its pump, which is driven by a different type of 
electricity source (diversity), and two separate operation pipes. Only one of each duplicate 
element is needed at a time (redundancy).  
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Fig. 10 An example of SFP cooling system safety standards [30] 
 
 
 
The steps of the probabilistic safety assessment are summarized as follows:  
 Selection of the external event (Hazard). 
 Hazard assessment. 
 Analysis of the response. 
 Model development.  
 Risk quantification and interpretation of results.  
 Measures development and implementation to reduce high risk.  
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  As the frequency of an event increases, the severity (consequence) of this event 
increase as well, which in turn push the decision maker to modify the existing systems to 
reduce the risk value. In other words, the purpose of the risk assessment in nuclear safety 
is to evaluate the risk upon which the decision-making process depends. Fig. 11 shows the 
relation between the frequency of an event and the consequence severity. In order to 
estimate the severity of an event, sources of risk must be identified and accounted for. 
Risk can be caused by a natural disaster (such as in the case of Fukushima nuclear power 
plant) or can be a side effect of human error (such as in the case of Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant). 
 
 
 
Fig. 11 Frequency level vs consequence severity [29]  
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3.2 The Boolean Analysis Method 
 
 This section provides a brief explanation about the Boolean logic method, which 
was used in calculating the top event frequency starting from basic event. The Boolean 
method helps trace a series of events that could lead to the top event. The series of events 
start with an IE and then could progress to a top event, which are chains of events that link 
the initiator to the top event. The Boolean logic method has indicator names and operators 
as follows: 
  Indicator names: True, 1, Yes, False, 0, and No.  
  Main Boolean operators, also called gates, are: 
- OR (represents addition, otherwise symbolized as  +), 
- AND (represents multiplication, otherwise symbolized as * or x). 
- NOT (represents symbols such as /, /x, x’, ‘). 
 
Developing failure scenarios starts with making fault trees (a deductive analysis 
that allows analysts to proceed from the top event to elementary events) to graphically 
represent the interaction of a component failure and other events within a system using the 
Boolean logic method [30]. Fig. 12 below shows an example of how to graphically 
represent the component failure in a specific system as a fault tree, starting from the basic 
event that may lead to the system failure. The fault tree allows identifying sequences (or 
combinations) of events that result in system failure. The combination of events are 
described by the logical AND and OR (and occasionally NOT) Boolean operators. 
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Fig. 12 Components failure fault tree graphical representation [29] 
 
 
 
Fig. 13 provides an example of a hypothetical situation for a top event (T) representation 
initiated by the basic events A, B, or C. [29]. The failure of top event (T) is conditioned 
by the failure of (C) or failure of both (A&B).  If the individual frequency of each of the 
basic events (A), (B,) and (C) is known, the top event frequency (T) can be calculated by 
substituting the frequency values of (A), (B), and (C) in (T=C+A*B). To verify how (T= 
C+A*B), Boolean logic method is implemented, starting from the top of the fault tree in 
Fig. 13 and moving down as following:  
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Fig. 13 Fault Tree of Top event (T) initiated by basic events A, B, or C 
 
 
 
T= E1*E2, (Since an AND gate is between E1 and E2).  
E1= A+E3 (since an OR gate is between A and E3).  
E2= C+E4 (since an OR gate is between C and E4). 
Then substituting the values of E1 and E2 in T  
T= (A+E3)*(C+E4) = (A*C) + (A*E4) + (E3*C) + (E3*E4). 
 E3=B+C. 
 Substituting in T  
T= A*C+A*E4+ (B+C)*C+ (B+C)*E4 
T = (A*C+B*C+C*C+E4*C) +A*E4+B*E4  
T=C+A*E4+B*E4, where E4=A*B. 
T
E1 E2
E3 E4
B C A B
CA
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T=C+A*A*B+A*B*B.  Applying some Boolean algebra rules (such as: A*A= A, 
A+A=A, A*(A+B) = A), then T will be: 
 T=C+A*B  
  Most of the fault trees that were built in this research were direct and simple fault 
trees. Fig. 14 shows an example that illustrates how to calculate the frequency of top event 
from a combination of basic events for such a simple fault tree.  
 
 
Fig. 14 Top event frequency calculation example. 
 
 
 
 After calculating the frequency of the top events, the next step is to evaluate the 
consequence for risk value estimation. In this study, this evaluation was performed using 
an event tree (see Fig. 15), which is a graphical technique to evaluate the consequence by 
mapping all probable outcomes of an IE in logical sequence [31]. An event tree is 
generated by combining the top events as functions. These functions are represented as 
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blocks with two arrows, either success (upward arrow) or failure (downward arrow). The 
following steps summarize the event tree representation process:  
 Determination of possible plant responses to each of the IE 
 Identification of the event sequences that could occur following success or failure 
of system function. 
 Categorise the event sequences identified as success (ex. safety functions 
satisfied) or failure (ex. fuel damage) 
 
 
 
Fig. 15 Event tree representation example  
 
 
 
After an IE triggers an accident sequence (a chain of events linking the initiator 
and possible consequences), the outcome depends on the success or failure of the built-in 
safety functions; the worst case scenario might be reached if a specific function or several 
functions fail. Fig. 16 shows an example of an event tree accident sequence representation, 
the functions blocks represents safety and security systems with a security attack as an IE. 
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In this figure the failure of functions C, D, and E leads to an undesirable consequence (for 
example, fuel damage in a nuclear facility fuel storage area).  
 
 
 
Fig. 16 Accident sequence representation of an event tree. 
 
 
 
3.3. Safety Failure Analysis of the SFP Cooling Systems  
 
 This section reports the analysis that was conducted on the SFP cooling system to 
find the combined failure frequency of the primary and secondary cooling systems (see 
Fig. 2 for the layout of the cooling system) by building fault trees using SAPHIRE 
software. Also a natural failure of either primary or secondary cooling systems combined 
with a failure due to a natural external event was considered.  As mentioned before the 
primary cooling system provides the main cooling requirements to the SFP during normal 
conditions, while the secondary cooling system provides cooling during abnormal and 
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accident conditions. The following subsections provide several failure scenarios with the 
failure frequency calculations.  
 
3.3.1. Natural failure frequency calculation of the primary and secondary cooling 
systems independently     
 
 The main components of the primary cooling system that can cause a failure to the 
system are:  the main valve, valve-1, valve-2, pump-1, and pump-2. Primary cooling 
system failure can be occur due to the natural failure of any of the following: 
 Main cooling pumps 1 and 2 simultaneously. 
 The main valve. 
 Valves 1 and 2  
 Valve-1 and  main pump-2  
 Valve-2 and main pump-1  
 
A fault tree that is constructed for the primary cooling system of the SFP is shown 
in Fig. 17. The numbers in Fig. 17 represent the individual component (pumps, valves) 
failure frequency. Fault tree analysis provided the total natural random frequency of 
failure of the primary cooling system as 1.31E-02 per year (by applying Boolean logic 
method, which was discussed in section 3.2). 
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Fig. 17 Primary cooling system natural failure fault tree  
 
 
 
The secondary cooling system has two main components, which are the two 
cooling pumps. Failure of the secondary cooling system occurs when the electrical driven 
cooling pump and the diesel driven cooling pump fail simultaneously. Each pump has a 
failure frequency of 3.00E-5 per year. The fault tree that is constructed for the secondary 
cooling system of the SFP is shown in Fig. 18.  The numbers in Fig. 18 represent the 
pumps’ failure frequency. The fault tree analysis provided the overall natural random 
failure frequency of the secondary cooling system as 9.00E-10 per year. 
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Fig. 18 Secondary cooling system natural failure fault tree  
 
 
 
3.3.2. The simultaneous natural failure frequency of the primary and secondary 
cooling systems  
  
The primary and secondary cooling systems might simultaneously fail naturally as 
described in the event tree shown in Fig. 19. In this scenario, the total frequency of failure 
for the cooling systems is:  the natural frequency of failure for the primary cooling system 
1.31E-02 per year (see Fig. 17) times the natural frequency of failure for the secondary 
cooling system 9.00E-10 per year (see Fig. 18) which is equal to 1.18E-11 per year. This 
frequency value is the SFP cooling system natural safety frequency of failure.  
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Fig. 19 Primary and secondary cooling systems natural failure event tree  
 
 
 
3.3.3. Natural failure frequency of the SFP cooling system initiated by a heavy load 
drop 
 
In this analysis, the failure of the cooling system occurs due to the failure of both 
primary and secondary cooling systems simultaneously, initiated by an external or internal 
event and a natural mechanical component failure. Many scenarios could be analyzed such 
as a heavy load dropped on the primary cooling system causing it to fail, accompanied by 
natural failure of the secondary cooling system. The event tree in Fig. 20 represents this 
scenario.  
To calculate the total frequency of failure for this scenario, the heavy load drop 
frequency is needed, which is equal to 2.1E-05 per year [13]. Then, the total frequency of 
failure is: the frequency of failure for the primary cooling system due to the heavy load 
drop (2.1E-05 per year) times the natural frequency of failure for the secondary cooling 
system ( 9.00E-10 per year), which is equal to 1.89E-14 per year. 
 Another scenario was considered, in which the cooling system failure is due to a 
heavy load dropped on the secondary cooling system causing it to fail accompanied by a 
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simultaneous natural failure of the primary cooling system. This is unrealistic scenario to 
happen, but still a scenario to be analyzed. Fig. 21 represents this scenario.  Then, the total 
frequency of this type of failure is: the natural frequency of failure for the primary cooling 
system( 1.31E-02 per year) times the frequency of failure for the secondary cooling system 
due to heavy load drop ( 2.1E-05 per year),which is equal to  2.75E-07 per year. 
 
 
Fig. 20 Cooling system failure due to heavy load drop with natural failure 
 
 
 
Fig. 21 Cooling system failure due to natural failure with heavy load drop  
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3.3.4. Natural safety failure frequency of the SFP cooling system initiated by a seismic 
event 
 
 In this section, two scenarios are analyzed. First the primary cooling system fails 
to operate due to a seismic event, accompanied by natural failure of the secondary cooling 
system. The event tree in Fig. 22 represents this scenario. The seismic event frequency is 
2.0E-6 per year [13]. Therefore, the total failure frequency of the cooling system in this 
scenario is:  the frequency of failure for the primary cooling system due to seismic event 
(2.0E-06 per year) times the natural frequency of failure for the secondary cooling system 
(9.00E-10 per year) which is equal to 1.80E-15 per year. 
 The second scenario is that a natural failure of the primary cooling system, 
accompanied by a seismic event causes the secondary cooling system to fail. The event 
tree represents this scenario shown in Fig. 23. The total frequency of failure for the cooling 
system is:  the natural frequency of failure for the primary cooling system (1.31E-02 per 
year) times the secondary cooling system failure due to a seismic event (2.0E-06 per year), 
which is equal to 2.62E-08 per year. 
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Fig. 22 Cooling system failure due to seismic with natural failure  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 23 Cooling system failure due to natural failure with seismic  
 
 
 
3.4. Safety Cooling  System Natural Failure Risk Estimation 
 
 Calculation of the risk value requires knowledge of the consequence value (C, in 
Eq.1 and Eq.2). Using Eq .7 with a level 4 accident on the INES scale, the associated 
consequence value C is 8.0E-4. The risk value associated with each scenario of failure is 
estimated by multiplying the consequence value with the failure frequency using Eq .2. 
Table 4 summarizes the previously calculated failure frequencies and gives the risk 
estimates of each natural safety failure scenario described in section 3.3., also the security 
initiated failure frequency values. 
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Table 4 Failure frequencies and risk values for the SFP cooling system failure scenarios 
(safety and security without overlap)  
 
Scenario 
No. 
Scenario Description   IE  Failure 
Frequency/ y 
Total  Failure  
Frequency/ y 
Risk / y  
1. All natural safety failure   1.31E-02 1.18E-11 9.44E-15 
2. Heavy load dropped on the  
primary system  and natural failure 
of  the secondary system 
2.1E-05  1.89E-14 1.51E-17 
3. Natural failure of the primary 
system and heavy load dropped on  
the secondary system and  
1.31E-2 2.75E-07 2.20E-10 
4. Seismic event on the  primary 
system and natural failure of the 
secondary system  
2.0E-06 1.80E-15 1.44E-18 
5. Natural failure of the primary 
system and seismic event on the  
secondary  system and  
1.31E-02 2.62E-08 2.09E-11 
6. All security failure  1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.52E-07 
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4. SAFETY- SECURITY SYSTEMS COMBINED ANALYSIS  
 
 This section introduces the combined safety-security failure analysis process for 
the cooling system of the SFP target. The results of a combination of component failures 
based on a specific scenario were analyzed to determine the main system failure 
frequency.  Several IE’s can trigger serial system failure. This could be security IE 
followed by a safety system failure or started by natural failure followed by a security 
event. The joint safety-security analysis of the SFP cooling system failure is carried out 
by forming event trees accounting for component failure scenarios with a security event. 
For quantitative assessment of risk associated with system failure frequency, many IEs 
categories were considered in analyzing the system failure process such as:  
 Security event  
 Heavy load drop event 
 Seismic event  
 Tornado  
 Aircraft impact 
 Internal Fire   
 Loss of coolant inventory  
 
The previous section discussed only two examples of IE, but this section extended 
into more IEs to show the range of possible IEs that the analyst usually should consider in 
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the analysis process. Considering more IEs should contribute to a more comprehensive 
total risk value estimation.  
In order to calculate the total frequency of failure of the SFP cooling system, the 
frequency of IE needs to be known. The frequency of a security IE was estimated in 
security analysis section-2 earlier in this research to be 1.63E-04 per year, in which this 
frequency value was determined based on the probability of adversaries’ attack and the 
vulnerability of the security systems. As previously mentioned the heavy load drop 
frequency is 2.1E-05 per year while the seismic IE frequency is 2.0E-6 per year [13]. 
A security based terrorist attack could compromise the objectives of the SFP 
cooling system by causing it to drain completely or partially resulting in numerous 
negative consequences. Once the water level in the pool falls down, the level of radiation 
increases, which could prevent direct safe access to the area around the SFP building. Also 
the ability to remove the decay heat would be reduced especially when the water level 
drops much below the top of the fuel assemblies. This would increase the temperature of 
the fuel assemblies, and might cause oxidation of the zirconium cladding. Also this could 
cause a fuel meltdown and large amount of radioactive material release, which is the main 
goal of the adversaries. The next section explains the analysis of the combined failure 
scenario with the calculation of the joint failure frequencies.  
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4.1. Combined Safety-Security Failure Frequency of the Cooling System  
 
Many scenarios could be analyzed based on the behavior of the adversaries once 
they arrive at the SFP area, as they might bomb the pool itself or its components. Each 
action the adversaries might take is considered as an IE. Fig. 24 shows the event tree of 
both the adversaries’ possible attacks and cooling system components’ natural failure.   
These adversaries’ possible attack include: Direct attack to the spent fuel pool, attack to 
the primary cooling system, or attack to the secondary cooling system. 
Combining the attack scenario at the primary cooling system with the natural 
failure process would change the primary cooling system natural failure fault tree (see Fig. 
17) to as it appear in Fig. 25. According to SAPHIRE.8 software, the new calculated 
combined failure frequency of the primary cooling system is 1.31E-2 per year, which is 
the same as the natural frequency of failure of the primary cooling system since the valve 
failure frequency (1.30E-02 per year) dominates the failure process. Fig. 26 shows the 
fault tree of the secondary cooling system failure including a security attack. The next 
sections present the failure scenarios for the cooling system due to security sabotage 
accompanied by natural safety failure or external events such as: (1) heavy load drop (2) 
seismic event (3) tornado (4) aircraft crash.    
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Fig. 24 Event tree of possible SFP failure scenarios including security attack 
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Fig. 25 Fault tree of primary cooling system failure including security attack
 54 
 
 
Fig. 26 Fault tree of secondary cooling system failure including security 
attack 
 
 
 
4.1.1. Security sabotage of the primary cooling system and natural failure of the 
secondary cooling system  
 
This failure scenario included a security sabotage event at the primary cooling 
system in conjunction with a natural failure event at the secondary cooling system. The 
event tree constructed for this scenario is shown in Fig. 27. The objectives of the scenario 
analysis for a security sabotage event are (1) to calculate the joint frequency of failure and 
risk value in order to compare these values to the resulting values of a cooling system 
failure without a security event, and (2) to determine how much a security event can affect 
the risk value.    
 55 
 
The joint failure frequency is determined by combining the security attack 
frequency at the primary cooling system, which is 1.63E-04 per year (see section 2.3)  with 
the secondary cooling system natural failure frequency ( 9.00E-10 per year) ,  which is 
1.47E-13 per year.  
 
 
 
Fig. 27 Cooling system failure scenario due to security attack with natural failure  
 
 
4.1.2. Natural failure of the primary cooling system and security sabotage of the 
secondary cooling system  
 
The joint failure frequency calculation for this scenario is found by combining the 
natural failure frequency at the primary cooling system (1.31E-02 per year) with the 
secondary cooling system failure due to security sabotage (1.63E-04 per year) which is 
2.14E-06 per year. The event tree constructed for this scenario is shown in Fig. 28. 
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Fig. 28 Cooling system failure due to natural failure with security attack  
 
 
 
4.1.3. Cooling system failure due to security sabotage in conjunction with a heavy load 
drop event 
 
 
If any attack causes the primary cooling system to fail, the secondary cooling 
system will be triggered to start injecting water to the pool. This scenario analyses a 
security sabotage attack caused failure at the primary cooling system accompanied by 
failure of the secondary cooling system due to heavy load drop. The event tree below in 
Fig. 29 shows the failure process of this scenario.  
 
 
 
Fig. 29 Cooling system failure due to security attack with heavy load drop  
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 The joint frequency of failure calculation is found by combining the security attack 
frequency at the primary cooling system (1.63E-04 per year ) with the heavy load drop 
frequency at the secondary cooling system (2.1E-05 per year ) which is 3.42E-09 per year. 
Note: if the scenario were changed as the security attack happening at the secondary 
cooling system with heavy load drops at the primary cooling system, this gives the same 
joint failure frequency value ( because the security attack event and the heavy load drop 
event have fixed  frequency values). 
 
4.1.4. Cooling system failure due to security sabotage in conjunction with a seismic 
event  
 
 
This failure scenario includes a security sabotage event in conjunction with a 
seismic event that caused failure to either the primary or secondary cooling systems. In 
this scenario, a security sabotage attack caused failure at the primary cooling system 
accompanied by failure of the secondary cooling system due to seismic event. This 
scenario is unrealistic to happen, but still could be analyzed.  The event tree constructed 
for this scenario is shown in Fig. 30. 
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Fig. 30 Cooling system failure due to security attack with seismic  
 
 
 
The joint frequency of failure calculation is found by combining the security attack 
frequency at the primary cooling system (1.63E-04 per year ) with the seismic event 
frequency at the secondary cooling system (2.00E-06 per year ), which is 3.28E-10 per 
year. Note: if to change the scenario as the security attack happening at the secondary 
cooling system with seismic event at the primary cooling system, this gives the same joint 
failure frequency value ( because the security attack event  and the seismic event have 
fixed frequency values). 
 
4.1.5. Cooling system failure due to security sabotage in conjunction with a tornado  
 
 In this scenario, a security sabotage attack caused failure at the primary cooling 
system accompanied by failure of the secondary cooling system due to a tornado is 
analyzed. The event tree constructed for this scenario is shown in Fig. 31 
 
 
 59 
 
 
Fig. 31 Cooling system failure due to security sabotage with tornado 
 
 
The frequency of tornado is considered to be 2.20E-07 per year [13]. The joint failure 
frequency calculation is carried out by combining the security attack frequency at the 
primary cooling system (1.63E-04 per year) with the tornado frequency at the secondary 
cooling system (2.20E-07 per year ), which is 3.58E-11 per year. Note: if the scenario 
were changed as the security attack happening at the secondary cooling system with 
tornado at the primary cooling system, this gives the same joint failure frequency value ( 
because the security attack event  and the tornado  have fixed frequency values). 
 
 
4.1.6. Cooling system failure due to security sabotage in conjunction with an aircraft 
crash  
 
In this scenario, a security sabotage attack caused failure at the primary cooling 
system, which is accompanied by failure of the secondary cooling system due to an aircraft 
crash event. The event tree constructed for this scenario is shown in Fig. 32. 
 
 
 60 
 
 
Fig. 32 Cooling system failure due to security attack with aircraft crash  
 
 
 
The frequency of aircraft crash in to or near a spent fuel pool is considered to be 7.0E-07 
per year [13]. The joint frequency of failure calculation is found by combining the security 
attack frequency at the primary cooling system (1.63E-04 per year ) with the aircraft crash  
frequency at the secondary cooling system (7.0E-07 per year ), which is 1.14E-10 per 
year. Note: if the scenario were changed as the security attack happening at the secondary 
cooling system with aircraft crash at the primary cooling system, this gives the same joint 
failure frequency value (because the security attack event  and the aircraft crash  have 
fixed frequency values). 
 
4.2. Combined Safety-Security Cooling System Failure Risk Estimation 
 
As pointed out before in section-1, the consequence value C is common between 
safety and security as both affect the public domain. Using Eq .7 with a level 4 accident 
on the INES scale, the associated consequence value C is 8.0E-4.  The risk value 
associated with the scenario of failure estimated by multiplying the consequence value 
with the failure frequency using Eq .2. Table 5 summarizes the combined failure frequency 
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and the combined risk estimates of the safety-security failure scenarios analyzed in sub-
sections 4.1.1-4.  
 
Table 5 Combined failure frequencies and risk values of the safety-security failure 
scenarios 
 
S/  
No. 
Scenario Description   IE  Failure 
Frequency/ y 
Total  Failure  
Frequency/ y 
Risk / y  
1. Security event at the primary and natural 
failure of the secondary  
1.63E-04 1.47E-13 1.17E-16 
2. Natural failure of the primary and 
security event at the secondary   
1.63E-04 2.14E-6  1.71E-09 
3. Security event at the primary and heavy 
load drop on secondary or vice versa  
1.63E-04 3.42E-09 2.73E-12 
4. Security event at the primary and seismic 
on secondary or vice versa 
1.63E-04 3.28E-10 2.60E-13 
5. Security event at the primary and tornado 
on secondary or vice versa 
1.63E-04 3.58E-11 2.86E-14 
6. Security event at the primary and aircraft 
crash  on secondary or vice versa 
1.63E-04 1.14E-10 9.13E-14 
 
 
 
4.3. Combined Safety-Security Analysis for Emergency Diesel Generators  
 
 
 
 The combined methodology, which was developed in this research and applied to 
the SFP target can be applied to any target in a nuclear facility. For this reason, another 
 62 
 
target is considered in this section, which is the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) 
system. The initiating event for this problem is the Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). The 
Emergency Power System (EPS) is assumed to be in the same location of the previous 
target (SFP) and composed of three Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). The security 
attack frequency is the same for the scenario where any diesel generator or any 
combination of two diesel generators is attacked by adversaries since they are located at 
the same location as the SFP. 
 The scenario assumed in this section is the adversaries attack on the EDGs 
happens after the LOOP initiating event accompanied with Common Cause Failure (CCF) 
of one or two EDGs. To calculate the combined failure frequency of such a scenario, the 
CCF frequencies of the EDGs are required with the previous security attack frequency 
(1.63E-04 attack per year). The failure frequencies that are considered in this analysis are 
as follows:  
  LOOP frequency is 3.60E-02 f/year. 
 Each single failure of any diesel generator is 5.3 f/year  
 2 EDGs out of 3 failure frequency is 0.162 f/year.  
 3 EDGs out of 3 failure frequency is 0.103 f/ year [32]. 
Since the CCF frequencies are conditional failure based on a blackout case, then the CCFs 
as follows:  
 1 out of 3 CCF-rate is 1.9E-01 f/year (single failure rate multiplied by the 
LOOP frequency, it's assumed that the LOOP event and 1 EDG failure to start 
are independent events). 
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 2 out of 3 CCF-rate is 5.83E-03 f/year (considered the combinations of any 
diesel generators failure, it's assumed that the LOOP event and 2 EDGs failure 
to start are independent events). 
 3 out of 3 CCF-rate is 3.71E-03 f/year (it's assumed that the LOOP event and 
3 EDGs failure to start are independent events). 
 
Two scenarios were considered in this section for EDGs target. The first scenario 
is that one diesel generator is attacked by the adversaries causing it to fail, accompanied 
with 2 out of 3 CCF of the EDGs. The event tree constructed for this scenario is shown in 
Fig. 33. 
 
 
 
Fig. 33 EDGs failure due to security attack and 2 out of 3 CCF 
 
 
 
The combined frequency of failure for this scenario is the multiplication of the security 
attack frequency (1.63E-04 attack/year) by the 2 out of 3 CCF- rate (5.83E-03 f/year), 
which gives 1.13E-06 f/year. 
 The second scenario is described in the event tree in Fig. 34, in which the 
security attack causing two EDGs to fail accompanied with 1 out of 3 CCF of the EDGs.  
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Fig. 34 EDGs failure due to security attack and 1 out of 3 CCF 
 
 
 
The combined frequency of failure for this scenario is the multiplication of the security 
attack frequency (1.63E-04 attack/year) by the 1 out of 3 CCF- rate (1.9E-01 f/year), which 
gives 3.10 E-05 f/year. The total combined frequency of failure for these two scenarios is 
the summation of the two scenarios combined frequency of failure (because security attack 
could happen to 1 Or 2 EDGs), which is 3.21 E-05 f/year.  
 The purpose of this section was to show that this developed methodology can be 
applied anywhere in the facility to any systems present. Considering the security attack 
(non-random event) in a random event failure series changes the failure frequency and is 
known as the combined frequency of failure. In the combined analysis, the security event 
(non- random event) is considered as a random event in the safety failure series process, 
which enables the probability multiplication to get the combined failure frequency. 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
 This section provides a summary of the results risk values calculated for initiating 
events of security-type, safety-type and combined security-safety type using a new 
methodology. The first analysis section was the security pathway analysis, in which the 
goal was to calculate the security parameters that led to security risk value estimation. This 
was done by analyzing a specific adversaries’ path starting from offsite area toward the 
target. Table 6 summarizes the calculated security parameters values along with the 
resulting risk values.  As shown in the table, the risk value associated with the security-
only scenario, a probable direct attack to the SFP, is estimated to be 1.3E-07 per year. 
With a uncertainty of 10% assumed in the frequency of attack, PA the uncertainty in 
security risk value is very small and can be neglected.  
 
Table 6 Security risk analysis parameters results and uncertainty  
 
Security Parameters Results Uncertainty  
Frequency of attack (attack / year) 1.0E-03 1.0E-04 
Probability of interruption 0.89 5.4E-02 
Probability of neutralization 0.94 9.4E-02 
Consequence 8.0E-04 8.0E-05 
Frequency of security event (successful attack /  year ) 1.63E-04 1.0E-05 
Security Risk ( year ) 1.3E-07 1.52E-08 
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 For a different path, the risk value changes because at each path the security 
parameters have different values based on the deployed security systems. The PI value 
depends on the probability of detection and the time delay that each protection element 
provides between the physical protection layers. The PN value depends on the capabilities, 
tactics and strength of both the adversaries and the response force during the engagement.  
 Safety and safety-security analyses were applied to the SFP cooling system to 
calculate the failure frequency of the system based on different failure scenarios. The 
cooling system is composed of a primary and a secondary system. The primary cooling 
system’s natural failure is 1.31E-02 per year, while the secondary cooling system’s natural 
failure frequency is 9.0E-10 per year (the failure frequency of the system depends on the 
individual components’ failure frequencies). Table 7 summarizes the risk value for all the 
cases that were analyzed in this research along with the uncertainty in the risk values, 
which is calculated by applying Eq.6  
Based on the risk values one can note that the safety system showed high reliability 
conditions because the resulting risk value for a pure natural failure of the safety cooling 
system was 9.44E-15 per year. The safety failure frequencies are so small because they 
are dominated by a combination of pumps, each with a failure frequency of 3.0E-05 per 
year and a consequence value of 8.0E-04. The total risk value is calculated by the 
summation of risk values associated with all of the possible failure events. The security 
attack risk values are higher than the natural safety failure by a factor of 1.0E+08, causing 
a significant impact on the system total risk value.  The security attack event dominated 
the combined safety-security analysis risk values. For example, it changed the complete 
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system natural failure from 9.44E-15 per year to 1.71E-09 per year, a factor of 1.0E+06, 
when a security attack caused the secondary cooling system to fail rather than a natural 
failure. Based on this result, it should be a requirement for future analysts to consider the 
deployed security systems in the analysis process in order to provide a better estimation 
of the total risk value. 
 A heavy load drop, seismic was considered as an external initiating event that can 
cause the cooling system to fail, along with a natural mechanical failure of the system 
components. A heavy load drop on the secondary cooling system and natural failure of the 
primary cooling system resulted in a failure frequency value of 2.20E-10 per year for the 
cooling system, higher than the failure frequency value of the seismic initiating event.  A 
security event affected and increased the total resulting value of failure frequency when 
combined with a heavy load drop, seismic, tornado, aircraft events. A tornado and aircraft 
crash were analyzed to show that different initiating events could be considered in order 
to find the total risk value.   
The uncertainty results show very small error values, which range from 10 to 20% 
of the calculated values. Therefore, it can be neglected because it has minor effects on the 
calculated failure frequencies and their associated risk values. The next section provides 
more illustrations about the uncertainty calculations in this research.     
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Table 7 Summary of the analyzed scenarios risk values and uncertainty  
 
S/  
No 
Scenario Description  Risk / y  Uncertainty /y 
1. Pure security attack  1.3E-07 1.52E-08 
2. Cooling system all  natural  safety failure   9.44E-15  1.85E-15 
3. Heavy load drop on the  primary  and natural 
failure of  the secondary systems 
1.51E-17 3.0E-18 
4. Heavy load drop on  the secondary system and 
natural failure of the primary system     
2.20E-10 3.81E-11 
5. Seismic event on the  primary system and natural 
failure of the secondary system  
1.44E-18 2.87E-19 
6. Seismic event on the  secondary  system and 
natural failure of the primary system 
2.09E-11 8.13E-12 
7. Security event at the primary and natural failure 
of the secondary 
1.17E-16 2.14E-17 
8. Security event at the secondary and natural failure 
of the primary 
1.71E-09 2.64E-10 
9. Security event at the primary and heavy load drop 
on secondary or vice versa 
2.73E-12 4.20E-13 
10. Security event at the primary and seismic on 
secondary or vice versa 
2.60E-13 4.68E-14 
11. Security event at the primary and tornado on 
secondary or vice versa 
2.86E-14 5.16E-15 
12. Security event at the primary and aircraft crash  
on secondary or vice versa 
9.13E-14 1.64E-14 
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5.1 Uncertainties of the Frequency of Failure and the Estimated Risk Values 
 
 The calculated failure frequency values and the estimated risk values for any 
specific component are subjected to uncertainties. The uncertainty value of the total 
frequency of failure and its associated risk value depend on the uncertainty of the 
individual component’s failure frequency. The uncertainty of frequency of failure for each 
individual component (such as:  frequency of failure for valves, pumps, etc.) is assumed 
to be 10% of its value (ex. the pump failure frequency is 3.0E-05 per year and the 
uncertainty in it is 3.0E-6. The valve failure frequency is 1.3E-02 per year and its 
uncertainty is 1.3E-03 per year), since many instrument vendors provides components 
with failure frequency uncertainty between 10-20% to reflect its reliability.  
The uncertainty of the total failure frequency and the associated risk value were 
calculated using Eq.5 (since most of the frequency calculation operations were 
multiplications).  The following is an example that shows the uncertainty calculation for 
the total failure frequency and its associated risk value for scenario-1 results that is 
summarized in Table 4 (see section 3.4) of the safety analysis section in this research: 
The total frequency of failure of scenario-1 is 1.18E-11 per year, this value is the result of 
multiplying the natural frequency of failure of the primary cooling system times the 
natural frequency of failure of the secondary cooling system (1.31E-2 * 9.0E-10). The 
uncertainty of failure frequency of the primary is 1.31E-03 per year (10% of the frequency 
of failure). The uncertainty of failure frequency of the secondary cooling system, depends 
on the failure frequency uncertainty of each pump (which is 3.0E-6 per year as assumed 
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before), using Eq.5 the uncertainty of the secondary cooling system frequency of failure 
is 1.27E-10 per year. Applying Eq.5 again to get the uncertainty of scenario -1 frequency 
of failure (all safety natural failure for the cooling system) gives the uncertainty value of 
2.0E-12 per year.   
Now, the uncertainty of scenario-1 risk value, coming from the uncertainty in the 
consequence value is 8.0E-5 (10% of the consequence value), and the uncertainty of the 
total failure frequency value of scenario-1 in Table 4, that was just calculated. Applying 
Eq.5 again, the uncertainty of the first scenario risk value in Table 4 is 1.85E-15 per year. 
The uncertainty results for the analyzed scenarios in this research are summarized in the 
previous Table 7.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71 
 
6. CONCLUSION   
 
This research contained three major analysis sections: security, safety, and safety-
security risk analysis to study and analyze possible SFP accident scenarios to evaluate the 
proposed methodology of combined safety-security risk analysis. In previous works, 
safety and security risk analysis were done separately without interface. However, this 
thesis study brought out a methodology to perform combined security-safety risk analysis. 
The results of this applied new methodology clearly showed the importance of 
determining joint failure frequency of the top event from a combination of security and 
safety-type initiating events.  
The first analysis section was the security pathway analysis, in which the goal was 
to calculate the security parameters that led to the security risk value estimation. This was 
done by analyzing a specific adversary’s path from the offsite area to the target, addressing 
the detection and delay elements with their respective values of probability of detection 
and time delay. Analysis of the security path allowed for calculation of risk parameters 
such as the probabilities of interruption and neutralization, which led to the calculation of 
the initiating event frequency of a successful adversary attack on the spent fuel pool 
facility as 1.63E-04 per year.  
A methodology to assess the combined security-safety risk values associated with 
either a security initiating event or a safety initiating event was established and 
demonstrated for the case of a spent nuclear fuel pool. This was possible because the 
consequence value is shared between the safety and security risk equations.  PRA Level-
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1 was used for the safety analysis as well as the safety-security joint analysis sections in 
this research in order to calculate the associated system frequency of failure. The safety 
analysis represents a series of natural safety systems failure events, either a natural 
mechanical failure or a failure due to external events such as heavy load drop, seismic, 
and aircraft crash. On the other hand, the safety-security analysis considered a security 
initiating event followed by safety systems failure. The PRA analysis included fault and 
event trees formation, which were used for the description of failure scenarios from the 
basic event to the top event and calculation of the related frequency of failure of the 
analyzed system elements. The event and fault trees were formed using SAPHIRE 
software, which assisted the evaluation process of the chosen failure scenarios. 
 The main outcomes from this research were the calculation of the combined 
system failure frequency using a proposed new methodology, the estimation of the public 
risk associated with failure scenarios, and the determination of how much considering a 
security event in a series of safety events failure affect the total risk value. The safety 
analysis section analyzed the natural failure scenario for primary and secondary cooling 
system based on the individual components failure frequency combinations. The natural 
failure frequency of the primary cooling system was calculated to be 1.31 E-02 per year, 
while the secondary cooling system natural failure frequency was calculated to be 9.0E-
10 per year. The total natural safety failure of the cooling system resulted in a failure 
frequency of 1.18 E-11 per year. The pure safety analysis showed a reliable system with 
a very low public risk value of 9.44 E-15 per year. All the uncertainty values were in the 
 73 
 
range of 10-20% of the actual calculated values of the frequency of failure and its 
associated risk, which can be neglected since it has no major effects on the final results.  
Considering the security attack as an initiating event that triggers system failure 
was the implementation of this research methodology that led to the combined safety- 
security risk analysis estimation. Inserting the security initiating event changed the public 
risk value in some previously analyzed cases by a factor of E+06 as an example the safety 
natural failure of cooling system changed from 9.44E-15 per year to 1.71E-09 per year 
when considering the security attack as the failure reason of the secondary cooling system. 
 In Conclusion, the analysis showed that the security attack changed the risk value 
when considered in the failure process of the total system, creating a need to consider the 
security analysis in real cases with safety-security interfaces. More evaluation should be 
done to the security system measures in order to reduce the total associated risk value and 
provide item risk reduction. Future efforts should attempt further enhancement and 
development in the analysis of the deployed safety and security systems. 
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